This paper focuses on a regulator's choice between setting a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) or a tariff in a linear, Cournot duopoly, where a foreign firm competes with a local rival. Where a country is free to impose a tariff, it will not impose a HTBT. Only under a limited set of circumstances will the profit-shifting effect be sufficient to lead to total exclusion of the foreign firm: in other conditions, the country will set a tariff yielding some revenue. By contrast, if tariffs are constrained by international agreement, then the importing country will set an HTBT to exclude the foreign firm if and only if tariffs are reduced below a threshold level. Trade liberalisation agreements which only cover tariffs can reduce, rather than increase global welfare.
Introduction
With a steady reduction in tari¤ barriers in recent decades, there is a widespread feeling that other, less visible forms of protectionism have increased. 1 Attention has particularly focused on technical barriers to trade (TBTs) -a raft of national regulations and standards, which allegedly discriminate in favour of domestic …r m s or consumers against foreign …r m s . Such barriers are more di¢ cult to identify, and more complex to model than standard tari¤ or quota barriers, yet a theoretical literature is gradually emerging, while policymakers increasingly focus on 'd e e p e r integration'agreements (notably the European Single Market) aimed at restricting technical and other barriers. In this paper, I extend the literature by examining the interaction between TBTs and tari¤ protection -in particular to investigate whether there is a potential causal link between tari¤ reform and the use of TBTs. I conclude that, if trade liberalisation concentrates exclusively on tari¤ reform, there is a potential threshold e¤ect, beyond which TBTs may be erected, and that such barriers may be both more restrictive and more costly than the original tari¤s.
Technical barriers to trade are far less explicit compared to other forms of trade protectionism -indeed, in many circumstances they consist more of a strategic bias in the setting of legitimate regulations and standards or border control institutions. Any analysis therefore needs to start with some de…ni-tions. First, there is a theoretical distinction between horizontal and vertical barriers: in their purest form, the former simply impose additional costs on potential foreign entrants to the market, and so are clearly discriminatory. 2 By contrast, vertical barriers exclude …r m s or products which provide a lower measurable level of safety, reliability or transparency -yet even though they are less obviously discriminatory, they can still treat local …r m s more favourably than foreign competitors (for example, where products are di¤erentiated and the local …r m is the higher-quality provider). In addition, technical standards may be distorted in order to redistribute income from the (partly) foreign-owned …r m s to local consumers. 3 However, the horizontal/vertical di¤erentiation is itself somewhat simpli…ed, since many regulatory barriers have both horizontal and vertical aspects. 4 When it comes to examining the likely strategic biases in standard-setting, it is also necessary to consider the international standard-setting regime. In particular, as intermediate steps between fully noncooperative standard-setting and fully cooperative, harmonised standard-setting, the WTO recognises National Treatment (NT) and Mutual Recognition (MR) regimes. NT allows countries to set standards for any goods sold within their own borders: in principle, this should not be discriminating 5 , but in practice there are many ways in which standards set under NT can have a strong element of horizontal discrimination. 6 Mutual Recognition -the principle primarily used in the European Single Market -is seen as more limiting on noncooperative behaviour. Under an MR regime, two or more countries agree to accept for sale, without further query, goods deemed …t for sale by their local regulator within the MR agreement. This type of regime limits the strategic bias in vertical standard-setting, at least as long as there are no externalities (Costinot, 2008) and trade is two-way and balanced (Edwards, 2004) . It is widely acknowledged that MR regimes limit the scope for pure, horizontal discrimination against foreign …r m s .
There has been some difurcation in the literature between theoretical papers and policy simulations of 'd e e p e r integration'. The latter, such as the studies on accession to the European Single Market by Baldwin et al (1997) or LeJour et al (2001) , generally assume existing regulatory barriers are purely cost-increasing. By contrast, the theoretical literature has generally concentrated on the case where quality standards are vertical (raising a minimum quality experienced by consumers) but apply most directly to the lower-quality …r m -following Das and Donnenfeld (1989) . In the absence of externalities use of R&D subsidies (as opposed to regulatory standards) when …r m s are internationally owned. 4 A classic example was the Japanese insistence on testing all batches of imported electronic goods -something which raised standards to consumers, but also clearly raised costs for importers more than for local producers. Other examples are those where a particular proprietory technology is speci…ed as a means of improving safety or environmental standards, or network compliance.
5 WTO (1995) . 6 This includes the imposition of particular technical speci…cations, which …t the agenda of local producers, or testing regimes which discriminate against foreign …r m s selling only a small amount to the local market. Also border delays, inland or remote testing sites (such as the French insistence in the 1980s that all imported video recorders be tested in Poitiers), visa di¢ culties and other bureaucratic delays. The scope for seeminly innocent regulations to be distorted is almost endless (as Maskus and Wilson's book, 2001, testi…es). (Costinot, 2008) , papers generally …n d an overregulation bias, which can be corrected, at least to some degree, by a MR regime.
A second class of theoretical models (Fischer and Serra, 2000, or Edwards, 2004) utilises a more traditional, Cournot duopoly framework, but analyses the strategic distortions in setting vertical product standards when one …r m is foreign. Again, a common …n d i n g is an overregulation bias under noncooperative NT standard-setting regimes. This Cournot approach derives from Brander's (1981) and Brander and Spencer's (1985) seminal works on subsidies for pro…t-shifting reasons in a Cournot duopoly, and has long been extended to more familiar trade instruments, such as tari¤s and quotas (e.g. Neary, 1994) . 7 This paper follows in this latter, Cournot pro…t-shifting tradition, in particular looking at the decision whether to protect a local …r m by means of a tari¤ or by regulation. In this case, for maximum clarity, I choose to focus on the case of pure, horizontal trade barriers in a linear Cournot duopoly, where …r m s based in di¤erent countries produce output which is experienced as identical quality by consumers, even though using di¤erent technology. Regulatory barriers are an alternative means of achieving pro…t-shifting towards a local …r m , when more visible alternatives, such as tari¤s, are ruled out by agreement.
The structure of the paper is as follows. I start in Section 2 by setting up a theoretical model of a Cournot duopoly, where one …r m is foreign. The local regulator chooses between either a tari¤ or a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT). Only under a limited set of circumstances will the pro…t-shifting e¤ect be su¢ cient to lead to total exclusion of the foreign …r m 8 : in other conditions, the country will set a tari¤ yielding some revenue (this is analysed in Section 3). In Section 4, I analyse the choice of HTBT when tari¤s are ruled out: it is shown that either a totally exclusionary barrier will be set, or no barrier at all -but the latter will only happen when the foreign …r m has lower costs than the local …r m . Section 5 then concentrates on the simpler case where costs are symmetric, and examines the interaction of the choice of tari¤ and HTBT, in the case where an international agreement limits the tari¤ which can be set. It is shown that the HTBT will only be applied 7 The key feature of these models is that the state is able to utilise subsidies or tari¤s to act as a …r s t -m ove r in the battle for market share between two …r m s , one of which comes from 'i t s ' c o u n t r y . Since a duopoly yields supranormal pro…ts, any policy which shifts market share towards one …r m will increase that …r m 's pro…ts, which may distort national welfare calculations. 8 Exclusion of potential foreign competitors in certain key indsutrial, service and utility sectors has been a feature of the 'e c o n o m i c patriotism'debate in Europe -notably France (Gros, 2006) . once the tari¤ falls below half its unconstrained level. However, once the tari¤ is reduced below this threshold, the HTBT which is chosen will exclude the foreign …r m completely, and will reduce global welfare below what it would have been with no tari¤ reduction agreement.
Linear model of pure, horizontal protection
In order to examine the interaction of regulatory protection and more traditional forms of protection (tari¤s), I concentrate on the most clear-cut case -a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade. I start by de…ning pure, horizontal regulatory barriers.
De…nition 1 A pure, horizontal regulatory trade barrier or technical barrier to trade is a set of regulations which impose higher costs on foreign producers than local ones, while not altering measurable quality.
Pure, horizontal barriers tend to include the stipulation of a particular technology (favoured by local …r m s ) , or (in the case of services) the use of regulatory procedures which are unfamiliar for foreign …r m s .
In order to understand the possible motivation for pure, horizontal protection in the case of a small country, I concentrate on a duopolistic industry, characterised by a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with linear demand functions. The two …r m s , 1 and 2, produce output, X 1 and X 2 . Concentrating on country 1, …r m 1 is local, while …r m 2 is foreign. Both …r m s produce at constant marginal costs, 1 and 2 ; which are not necessarily equal. Produce is not di¤erentiated. I start with the linear inverse demand function
where combined output Z = X 1 + X 2 . Associated consumer surplus is a quadratic function of Z:
Each …r m makes Cournot assumptions about its rival's output. Consequently, …r m 2's conjecture of its own pro…t from selling into country 1 is
where t 2 is a tari¤ on …r m 2's output, and 2 is a per-unit conversion cost for selling its output, resulting from a regulatory barrier imposed by country 1.
The superscript c on X c 1 indicates that this is …r m 1's output as conjectured by …r m 2. The equation for …r m 1 is similar, except that t and are both zero, since there is no protection against the local …r m . This makes it possible to drop the subscripts on t and , since I assume that a country will not impose tari¤s or regulatory barriers against its own producer.
I …n d each …r m 's reaction function by di¤erentiating (3) with respect to its own output, and then derive the Cournot-Nash equilibrium on the assumption that actual output of each …r m equals its rival's conjecture of its output . Table  1 , below, summarises the equilibrium. Table 1 : key equations of the Cournot-Nash model.
:
Combined sales (4c)
We l f a re in country 1 (7)
Global welfare (8)
Marg e¤ect of t or on X 1 (9)
Marg e¤ect of t or on Z (10)
Marg e¤ect of t on W 1 (11)
Marg e¤ect of on W 1 (12)
Output: foreign …r m excl.
We l f a re : foreign …r m excl.
Country 1 sets its policy to maximise its own welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus, tari¤ revenue and the home …r m 's pro…t. It is assumed the government regulator in country 1 can accurately predict the outcome of the subgame between the two …r m s , and so can act as a …r s t mover on behalf of …r m 1. This is in the tradition of models of strategic bias in a duopoly setting, such as Brander (1981) or Brander and Spencer (1985) . With either form of protectionist policy (tari¤ or HTBT), country 1 has a choice of setting the protectionist instrument either at a level which partially excludes the foreign …r m , or one which totally excludes the foreign …r m (in which case welfare at home will equal W 1M in equation (14)). The primary di¤erence between the two instruments is that a tari¤ yields a revenue -at least as long as there are some imports -while a HTBT is a resource cost imposed on the foreign …r m .
The domestic welfare calculation made by country 1's regulator is a balance of a number of e¤ects: …r s t , a reduction in consumer welfare from higher prices; second, a pro…t shifting e¤ect towards the domestic …r m and third, a tari¤ revenue e¤ect. These e¤ects are summarised in Table 2 below. Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of tari¤ and regulatory barrier setting, it is worth noting: Proposition 1: If the country is free to set tari¤s, and if the welfaremaximising tari¤s are not so high as to exclude the foreign …r m , then it will not impose a pure, horizontal regulatory barrier.
This follows since any level of {X 1 ; X 2 } which can be achieved with ft = 0; = kg can also be achieved with ft = k; = 0g: However, in the latter case, the tari¤ will yield a positive revenue.
First, I will examine tari¤-setting in the case where the country is free to set any level of tari¤s (and will therefore set = 0).
3 Unconstrained tari¤-setting I examine …r s t the case where a tari¤, t, is set without any constraint from international agreements or threat of retaliation. From Proposition 1, we can deduce that there will be no HTBT in this case. Country 1's welfare is given as (7) above. By simplifying (11), we …n d that the …r s t -o r d e r condition for an optimum is
which will be satis…ed by
For sales to be nonnegative, neither 1 nor 2 can exceed a. A tari¤ of t will lead to imports of
which will fall to zero if
something which will only happen (given the constraint that 1 ; 2 6 a) when 2 is large relative to 1 -in other words, the foreign …r m will only be excluded if it is higher cost than the local …r m , particularly when the market is large (a is high relative to 1 ; 2 ).
We can therefore deduce Proposition 2: If a tari¤ is freely set, it will be non-exclusionary, unless the foreign …r m has higher unit costs than the local …r m . This is because an exclusionary tari¤ will yield no revenue: at the margin, it is better in a linear model with symmetric costs to lower the tari¤ a little, to raise some revenue.
4 Setting a pure, horizontal barrier when there is no tari¤
Now assume that tari¤s are ruled out. The question is whether the country can raise its welfare by setting a pure, horizontal barrier against the imported good, 2, and if so how high.
The marginal gain from raising a non-tari¤ barrier is given by (12) above. When t is constrained to equal zero, this becomes:
Notice that, as long as 2 is not smaller than 1; this will be positive. Also that:
Lemma 1: If the government of a small country chooses to impose a pure horizontal regulatory barrier to increase welfare, it will set a su¢ ciently large barrier to exclude the foreign …r m from its market.
This …n d i n g is consistent with Edwards (2008) , and follows from the fact that
is monotonically increasing with respect to ; up to the point where the foreign …r m is excluded.
The intuition behind this analysis is that the pro…t-shifting e¤ect in a linear model is increasing with respect to either t or . This is because, in a linear model, the marginal e¤ect of raising a trade barrier on …r m 1's output is constant (
), but pro…ts per unit rise as the foreign …r m is gradually excluded, so that the marginal pro…t gain to …r m 1 of raising its output share is increasing. This is su¢ cient to outweigh the (increasing) marginal loss to consumers, so that, in the absence of any tari¤ revenue, it is worth increasing the HTBT right to the point where the foreign …r m is excluded.
In a linear, Cournot duopoly model with no …x e d costs of market entry, the market price tends to the monopoly price at the point where the foreign …r m quits the market. National welfare at this point is given by (14) above. This compares with national welfare in the absence of tari¤ or regulatory barriers of
Lemma 2: If ja 1 j > 2 j 1 2 j and there are no tari¤s, then the country is better o¤ excluding the foreign …r m .
This follows by setting W M = c W in (14) and (21) and rearranging, yielding
Proposition 3: If the country is unable to set a tari¤, then if the condition in equation (22) is met, it will set a regulatory barrier to exclude the foreign …r m .
This follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
To interpret this, we can concentrate on the case where both sides of (22) are positive (i.e. 2 is the lower-cost producer). We can also normalise a = 1 without loss of generality. This allows us to rewrite (22), deriving the critical value of 1 below which …r m 2 will be excluded:
This will equal 1 3 when 2 = 0; rising to 1 when 2 = 1; at which point industry sales are zero anyway. For comparison, when 2 is the higher-cost producer, (22) yields the result that …r m 2 will be excluded from country 1's market when
But this is exactly the same result that can be obtained by rearranging (4b) setting t = 0 and = 0: in other words, this upper bound (in terms of 2 ) is simply the limit where …r m 2 is too costly to have any market share in country 1, anyway. We can summarise these results in Figure 1 , below. Figure 1 , we deduce Proposition 4: In the absence of tari¤s, when both …r m s have equal marginal costs, the country will always choose to exclude the foreign …r m .
By inspection of
This follows since the upward-sloping diagonal, where …r m s 'c o s t s are equal, lies entirely within the zone where the regulator will choose an exclusionary HTBT, when tari¤s are ruled out.
This e¤ect produces an interesting discontinuity in our model of regulatory behaviour, which becomes apparent when we examine the e¤ects of international agreements limiting tari¤s.
Combination of a pure horizontal barrier and a tari¤
I now assume the country sets a tari¤, but this is …x e d by international treaty at t, which is assumed to be less than t : In these circumstances, the marginal e¤ect of a pure horizontal regulatory barrier on country 1's welfare, using the prime to indicate the case with a …x e d rate of tari¤s, is a touch more complicated than (20), since tari¤s are no longer zero:
When = 0; a marginal increase in will only increase welfare if 2 1 > t: However, @W 0 @ is increasing with respect to ; so even if a marginal increase in does not increase welfare, a larger increase may do so. It is straightforward to show that Lemma 1 continues to hold, even when tari¤s are non-zero, so if the government chooses to set a pure horizontal barrier, it will be large enough to exclude the foreign …r m completely. However, if it sets such a barrier it will be foregoing the revenue of the tari¤. It follows that, if relatively high tari¤s are allowed, the government may prefer to allow the foreign …r m to sell in the market, avoiding any regulatory barrier. However, if the maximum tari¤ allowed, t, falls below a threshold level, e t; then the government will prefer the regulatory barrier, and forego the tari¤ revenue.
I denote welfare where the tari¤ is set at t and there is no regulatory barrier as W t . Welfare if the foreign …r m is excluded is still W M as in equation (14) . Consequently, the country will be better imposing no regulatory barrier if and only if W t > W M :
When 1 = 2 = ; the threshold value of t = e t; below which a regulatory barrier will be imposed, should satisfy
There follows Proposition 5: If the two …r m s ' marginal costs are equal, then if the government is constrained to set a tari¤ of less than a 6
, it will impose a regulatory barrier to exclude the foreign …r m . By contrast, for higher tari¤ rates, it will not impose a regulatory barrier.
This follows since, for t < ; W M > W t ; while for t >
It is worth noting that, when marginal costs for the two …r m s are equal, e t = t 2 , so that the HTBT is only applied once the tari¤ is reduced to exactly half its unconstrained level.
Implications for global welfare
The main conclusion of this paper is that, when tari¤s are reduced by agreement below their noncooperative level, there may well be a threshold e¤ect below which other, less visible (but more costly) forms of protection come to be applied. In our fairly simple model, this threshold happens at half the unconstrained level of tari¤s, and takes the form of the imposition of costs which completely exclude the foreign …r m . The result is that restriction of a country's ability to set a tari¤, while not constraining its ability to impose regulatory protection may result in a more, rather than less protective outcome.
Where underlying costs are symmetric ( 1 = 2 = ), the welfare implications are not di¢ cult to derive. The di¤erence between national welfare in country 1 and global welfare is given by …r m 2's pro…ts,
when no regulatory barrier is imposed, (27a) 2 = 0 when a regulatory barrier is imposed.
Welfare can be summarised in Table 3 , below. This can also be displayed graphically as in Figure 2 , below. Figure 2 : the e¤ects of a regulatory protection threshold upon global and domestic welfare as tari¤s are cut.
We can draw a …n a l proposition: Proposition 6: When the two …r m s face equal unit costs, if tari¤s are reduced to below half their unconstrained level, and if HTBTs are not restricted, welfare in both countries will be lower than when tari¤s are set freely.
This follows Proposition 5 because an HTBT will be set to exclude the foreign …r m , once tari¤s are lowered below the threshold. However, assuming the regulator were free to set unrestricted tari¤s, then (assuming 2 did not exceed the threshold in (19)), it would freely choose a non-exclusionary tari¤, t . This is because the tari¤ revenue when t = t ensures country 1 a higher level of welfare than an exclusionary tari¤ or HTBT would do. But also, …r m 2 is making a positive pro…t in this case, whereas with an exclusionary tari¤ or HTBT its pro…t would be zero. Hence welfare is higher in both countries when t can be set at t :
An implication is that tari¤ liberalisation, if unaccompanied by restriction on regulatory barriers, can potentially trigger a switch to regulatory protection which lowers, rather than raising, global welfare.
Conclusion
By focusing on pure horizontal barriers, this paper concentrates on the most clear-cut 'c a s e for the prosecution', in the situation where barriers exist for no reason other than regulatory protection. It is shown that, in theory, this protection can potentially impede trade, and that this impediment can increase as tari¤ liberalisation proceeds. However, HTBTs are not the instrument of …r s t choice for protection, but can become attractive if other instruments are ruled out or limited. Under the conditions of this model, tari¤ liberalisation beyond a point can be counterproductive, unless HTBTs are constrained by Mutual Recognition agreements.
There is, however, a caveat. I have concentrated on the linear case due to its relative expositional simplicity. We cannot be sure whether these results generalise to vertical protection 9 , and whether they carry over to models with nonlinear demand functions requires further investigation.
The general issue of the extent to which regulatory barriers are actually likely to be of a pure horizontal type is also not straightforward. The persistence of such barriers under NT regimes which should supposedly exclude them, is widely-documented, and is a major argument in favour of Mutual Recognition agreements where possible. 10 Perhaps more common are either discriminatory vertical barriers 11 or mixed horizontal-vertical barriers. 12 Modelling vertical or mixed barriers to trade is notoriously di¢ cult, which is one reason why this paper concentrates on the simpler case of pure, horizontal barriers. The …n d i n g in this paper that the incentive to indulge in regulatory protection increases when tari¤s are reduced should provide motivation to extend the work to look at other types of regulatory barrier. 9 Edwards (2004). 10 Although MR agreements are also not without potential problems -Costinot (2008). 11 A vertical standard sets a minimum in terms of quality, safety, labelling or environmental standards on all goods sold in a market. However, if local producers tend to cluster at the high-quality end of a market, there will still be a strategic bias to overregulation. 12 A mixed horizontal-vertical standard is one which simultaneously dictates a mimimum measurable quality and a technology for achieving it (such as low particulate emissions from vehicles, and specifying the use of catalytic converters). Such standards can easily be tweaked to favour local producers.
Appendix: equation derivations
Utility is given by
I assume b > c. The …r s t order conditions for consumer optimisation are
Firms'revenue is
Consumer surplus
Let the two …r m s ' t o t a l costs be
where is a per unit conversion cost for …r m 2 to comply with the standard in country 1. Hence conjectured pro…t is
Cournot-Nash equilibrium Di¤erentiating (3a) and (5b) with respect to X 1 and X 2 respectively, we obtain the …r s t -o r d e r conditions for conjectured pro…t maximisation, which give the reaction functions of the two …r m s . ;
, we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium:
;
6bX 1 = 2a 4 1 + 2 2 + 2t + 2 ; 3bX 1 = a 2 1 + 2 + t + ;
Since price, P = a bZ;
then consumer surplus
Analysis with just a tari¤ Set = 0: The tari¤ raises a revenue T 1 for country 1's government of
Country 1's welfare now becomes
Note
Also
Consequently
But, since in X 1 = a 2 1 + 2 +t 3b
Note that this is diminishing with respect to t. The …r s t -o r d e r condition for the welfare-maximising tari¤ in these circumstances is
Note that, when t = t ;
3b ;
But for 2 ; 1 < a; we can work out if this will occur by normalising a = 1 without loss of generality. In this case,
Analysis with an HTBT Note that, as above
If country 1's welfare W 1 = V + 1 + T 1 , then
But, substituting in X 1 = 
) 4t 6b ;
Note that
is increasing with respect to :
is initially positive if and only if 2 > 1 + 2t: in other words, if the foreign …r m is the higher-cost producer. In this case, the regulator will choose to raise up to the point where …r m 2 leaves the market.
When we are looking only at the case with t = 0, then (10) becomes
Tot al exclusion of the foreign …r m I assume …r s t of all that there is no …x e d cost of entry into country 1's market. Once …r m 2 is excluded, …r m 1 acts as an unconstrained monopolist, facing an inverse demand curve P = a bX 1 :
and the …r s t order condition for maximisation is
However, note that this is the same level of output as implied by equation (6a) when is su¢ ciently high to drive X c 2 to zero. This means there is no sudden jump in prices once …r m 2 exits the market.
Consequently,
2 ;
so that
By contrast, in the initial state where = 0;
which will only be positive if
De…ne 
Combination of a tari¤ and an HTBT Since this is a rather complicated case, I focus on the case where costs are symmetric, so 1 = 2 = . I also scale a = 1 without loss of generality. We also note from di¤erentiating (12) that, regardless of t, @W 1 @ is monotonically increasing with respect to : This simpli…es the analysis, since it determines that, if a HTBT is applied, it will be to exclude …r m 2 completely. We therefore need simply compare welfare in country 1 with …r m 2 excluded with the maximum attainable when …r m 2 is not excluded. To simplify the analysis further, I substitute c = 1 :
I start by looking at the situation where a tari¤ alone is applied, but this is restricted by international agreement to t = t; and consider that initially there is no regulatory protection. First of all, we can rewrite
X 2 = c 2t 3b ; Z = 2c t 3b :
Also note that 
Consequently, .With the constraint t = t, we write constrained income with a tari¤ as
National welfare in the case of a monopoly is The critical value is the lower root:
e t = c 6 = 1 6 :
Note that this compares to the welfare-maximising tari¤ of If …r m 2 does exit (once t falls below e t),
